

**NTA results for Spain:**  
Measuring  
the degree of intervention of the public sector  
on intergenerational intra family transfers  
in Spain using NTA/GA

**Preliminary draft**  
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
# Outline

1. Motivation: rethinking the role of the welfare state
2. Measuring the degree of intervention of public sector in intergenerational intra family transfers using GA/NTA
  1. Theoretical Background
  2. NTA application
  3. GA application


# 1. Motivation: rethinking the role of the welfare state

## Before the welfare state: “Extended family”

Overlapping generations



- Intergenerational intra family transfers:
  - Backwards: from kids to old parents
  - Forward: from parents to kids
- ¿Financed? PAYG:
  - PAYG –except for some renters in the absence of capital markets



## Public pensions system

Substitutes ONLY backward transfers  
PAYGO Financing

Subject to demographic risk

¿causing decrease in fertility? *social security hypothesis*

### The transition problem:

Initial “gift” - “pensions to non contributors” - must be now supported by the transition generation who bears “2 burden”

### In fact three “burdens”

Raising children = future contributors to pensions for all the aged

## 2.1. Theoretical framework

Two main strands of literature:

- Private motives for intergenerational intra family transfers (IIT) and for government intervention on it
  - Saving motives: bequest motive
  - Motives for other IIT (inter-vivos donation, bequest, gifts to parents) –including fertility
  - Public sector intervention: Social policy as government intervention on IIT.
- Population ageing:
  - Effects on the economy and on the public budget
  - Is the demographic transition endogenous (economic decision)

Theoretical tool: Dynamic macroeconomic general equilibrium models (Overlapping generations models, GE-OLG): allowing for the analysis of IIT, i.e. with

- Backward and forward altruism
- Strategic behavior

Applied techniques: GA, NTA, large scale OLG, / microsimulation

Previous well known result:

Diamond model without any altruism –non private IIT– and exogenous fertility

Competitive economy is not Pareto optimal in Diamond model: Over or under accumulation. Pension policy:

- Under accumulation: Funding Though NOT Pareto optimal
- Over accumulation: PAYG is Pareto optimal


Samuelson's Serendipity Theorem: the only golden rule that is a steady state of the CE is the goldenest (optimal  $n$  planner), only reached by chance – $n^*$  = exogenous  $n$  in the CE

- The policy above does not lead to the goldenest, nor to the golden rule.

Why?:

- Both “production factors” need to be optimized at once.
- We need to consider endogenous fertility.

## Endogenous fertility Effects of increasing $n$ (both external )

$$f(k_t) + (1-d)k_t = c_t + \frac{d_{t+1}}{(1+n)} + (1+n)k_t$$


Interest: More that “optimal  $n$ “ be aware that policy interacts with fertility

- A unique instrument internalizing the externality  
pension = children contributions (IBC system)
- You can “save” in both “assets” – returns equated, GR reached.
- Unfeasible policy? Forgets status quo rights, insurance aspects...
- Equivalent policy:
  - PAYG family allowance of the same size
  - If transition: partially funded system equilibrating 3 burdens

¿ General practice?:

- First socializing the old, though asset market can do the job. ¿ Poverty?
- Second: socializing child –educational investment (effects on  $g$ !!)
- Lessons for DC both at the same time!

Spanish case: very low intervention on backward, very low fertility!!

# NTA for Spain

## Background

- Population

2000 - 40.499.000 hab

2006 - 44.708.000 hab

- High recent immigration

2000 - 2.23%

2006 - 9.26%

- TFR: Huge and quick fall from 3 at the end of 70s

1998 - 1.155


2006 - 1.382

- $e_0$  in 2000

Women - 82.46 || Men - 75.64



# Background Spain



# Objectives

First approach to the Lifecycle Deficit in Spain for 2000

First approach of the Public transfers profiles by age for the year 2000 in Spain

Comparison of both profiles: measuring the degree of intervention of public sector in intergenerational intra family transfers using NTA/GA

# Data sources

All data bases used where from 2000

## **ECPF - Household Budget Survey**

Longitudinal Data

3766 households - 11840 individuals

Only consumption information

## **PHOGUE - European Household Panel**

15614 households - 46045 individuals


Only income information

## **MTAS - Ministry of Labor and Social Security**

Information about pensions and social benefits

## **INE - National Statistical Institute**

# Labor Income per capita



Source: PHOGUE 2000

# Labor Income

Self-employment income represents 13% of total labor income

Labor income starts at age 14 and finishes drastically at age 70, both for earnings and self-employment

In Spain it *was not allowed* to receive any labor income while you receive retirement benefits

# Consumption

## Private

*Education* - Data only includes tuition, which excludes public students consumption in other education related goods


*Health* - Includes private health insurances

## Public


*Education* - Official data

*Health* - Using hospital processes expenditures. Represent 50% of public consumption

# Private consumption




# Public consumption





# Lifecycle Deficit




# Lifecycle Deficit

Surplus from 27 to 57 - 30 years

Bigger deficit for the elderly than for the children

Long-term care is included in other public consumption

# Public transfers outflows



# Public transfers inflows

Education

Health

Retirement benefits


Social Protection benefits

Other public transfers (in-kind and cash)


Transfers from the rest of the world (ROW)

Age profiles from public consumption (health and education) and from MTAS for Social Protection benefits


# Public transfers inflows



# Net Public Transfers



# LCD and TG



# Measuring the balance of public intervention in IIF

Public transfers represent a big share of the LCD for elderly



Young ages rely more in other sources than in public transfers to finance their deficit

Indicators? Share of adult income, share LCD...



	<b>% 2004 GDP</b>	<b>%2050 GDP</b>	<b>SGap (% intertp PIB )</b>
<b>Public budget primary balance</b>	+ 1,91	– 7,48	2.02
Public budget primary balance (excluding debt)	+ 1,91	– 7,48	0.85
Balance contributory –bismakian- pensions system	+ 0,9	– 6,17	1.49
Expenditure in contributory pensions (Social Security)	– 8,23	– 15,21	10,53
Health expenditure	– 5,29	– 8,5	6,50
Long term care expenditure	– 0,33	– 0,97	0,58
Family expenditure	– 0,5	– 0,47	0,47
Education expenditure	– 4,41	– 4,21	4,11

## Measuring the degree of intervention of the public sector on intergenerational intra family transfers in Spain using GA

Transfer	Generational Account	Expenditure/GDP (%)	
<b>From parents to kids</b>		<b>2.004</b>	<b>2.050</b>
Education	38,90	4,41	4,21
Family	5,20	0,5	0,47
Health –children	7,80	0,71	0,69
<b>Total</b>	 <b>51,9</b>	<b>5,60</b>	<b>5,37</b>
<b>From children to parents</b>		<b>2.004</b>	<b>2.050</b>
Retirement pensions	31,50	6,02	13,54
Dependency	0,60	0,33	0,97
Health -adults	14,00	4,58	7,81
<b>Total</b>	 <b>46,10</b>	<b>12,16</b>	<b>22,32</b>

**Thanks  
for your attention**